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The well-documented rise in economic inequal-
ity in the United States over the last two decades is 
somewhat misleading.  Almost all Americans, whether 
considered “rich” or “poor,” are better off economically 
today than in previous times.  Furthermore, due to 
the high degree of income mobility in the United 
States, most people move between income groups 
throughout their life. 
The gap between the top and bottom fifths of 
families measured by income (called quintiles) has 
increased substantially since about 1970.  The bottom 
quintile received 5.4 percent of all the money income 
in 1970, falling to 4 percent in 2005.  Meanwhile, 
the share of income going to the top quintile rose 
from 40.9 percent in 1970 to 48.1 percent in 2005. 
However, total income grew over that time, and the 
real income of every income group rose.  
Furthermore, household income varies substan-
tially for several reasons that are often ignored, includ-
ing: 1) differences in the number of family members 
who work, 2) differences in the amount of work and 
3) differences in age.
1.   High-income households are not likely to consist 
of one person earning a very high income (as is 
often assumed); rather, they are likely to have two 
or more income earners:
l In 2006, a whopping 81.4 percent of families 
in the top income quintile had two or more 
people working, and only 2.2 percent had no 
one working.    
l By contrast, only 12.6 percent of families in 
the bottom quintile had two or more people 
working; 39.2 percent had no one working.  
l The average number of earners per family for 
the top group was 2.16, almost three times the 
0.76 average for the bottom.  
2.   Census data show a large difference in full-time 
work and in the number of weeks worked in a 
year.
l Less than one-third of families in the lowest 
quintile had a head of household working 
full-time; in the top quintile, more than three-
fourths of families did. 
l Thus, average families in the top group have 
many more weeks of work than those in the 
bottom and, in the late 1970s, the 12-to-1 
total income ratio shrunk to only 2-to-1 per 
week of work, according to one analysis.
3.   Workers tend to start out at a low income, increase 
their earnings with experience, and then have lower 
incomes late in their careers or in retirement.  For 
example, peak earnings typically occur in the 35-
to-54 age group.  However:
l In the bottom income quintile, only one-third 
of households are headed by someone 35 to 
54; whereas, in the top quintile, more than half 
of household heads are in that age range. 
l The bottom group also has a much larger 
proportion of household heads more than 75 
years of age — 11.5 percent versus 2.3 percent 
for the top group. 
l The bottom also has more young heads of 
households ages 15 to 24 — 10 percent versus 
1.1 percent for the top.
Many redistribution advocates fail to see that rais-
ing marginal tax rates on higher incomes would, in 
fact, increase measured inequality.  The reason is that 
an increase in the marginal tax rate would discourage 
work.  This reduction in the supply of labor would 
drive up the before-tax pay of the highest earners.  All 
other things equal, their after-tax pay would decrease 
and after-tax inequality would fall — but (before-tax) 
measured inequality would rise.  
The income distribution should be judged not by 
how equal it is, but by how people obtained what they 
have.  Inequality due to government-granted privi-
leges, in the form of subsidies, quotas and so forth, is 
arbitrary and unfair, while inequality due to income 
earned through work and investment is just.
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Introduction1
The rise in economic inequality in the United 
States over the last two decades is well-documented 
by economists.  The attention researchers give this 
subject and the results they have found should be 
expected for two reasons. 
First, in U.S. society there is generally a strong egali-
tarian ethic.  Differences in income are widely suspect 
unless strongly justified, and accepted justifications 
are fairly narrow.  Economists share this egalitarian 
ethic as much as the general public, if not more so. 
Moreover, they focus much more consistently than 
the general public on the desirability of equality.  This 
egalitarian ethic among economists is not new.  In 
their famous critique of rent control, the late Milton 
Friedman and George Stigler wrote:
For those, like us, who would like even more 
equality than there is at present, not just for 
housing but for all products, it is surely better to 
attack directly existing inequalities in income 
and wealth at their source than to ration each 
of the hundreds of commodities and services 
that compose our standard of living.2
Second, economic inequality has been extensively 
documented because economists today have much 
greater access to a larger amount of data, as well as 
more tools to empirically analyze the data, than just 
a few decades ago.  Yet despite their sharpened tools, 
many economists have drawn incorrect empirical 
conclusions.  Fortunately, other economists have 
corrected them.  
In this study, I make five main points about in-
equality: 
1. Although income inequality has increased, it 
has not increased as much as some economists 
claim.
2. Even though inequality has increased, almost 
all Americans have become better off economi-
cally.
3.  Household income varies substantially for three 
reasons that are often ignored:  (i) differences 
in household size and especially in numbers of 
workers, (ii) differences in skill levels among 
people, and (iii), related to both of the above, 
differences in age.
4.  Income mobility substantially mitigates in-
equality, and income mobility in the U.S. 
economy is quite high.
5. The majority of economists judge how just an 
income distribution is only by how equal it is; 
they don’t ask how people obtained what they 
have.  This disregards the fact that, by and large, 
those with higher incomes have earned them.
The Basic Facts  
about Income Inequality
Income inequality of families in the United States 
has increased substantially since about 1970.  [See Ap-
pendix Table for detailed numbers.]  For instance: 
l	 In 1970, families in the lowest income quintile 
(fifth) received 5.4 percent of all the money 
income — falling to 5.3 percent in 1980, 4.6 
percent in 1990, 4.3 percent in 2000 and 4.0 
percent in 2005.  
l	 The share of income going to the top quintile 
of families, by contrast, rose from 40.9 percent 
in 1970 to 41.1 percent in 1980, 44.3 percent 
in 1990, 47.4 percent in 2000 and 48.1 percent 
in 2005.3   
These data clearly indicate increasing inequality, 
but they do not give the reasons for the increase. 
Nor do they show that “the rich got richer and the 
poor got poorer.”  This conclusion doesn’t follow for 
three reasons. 
“Inequality has increased, but all 
income groups are better off.”
First, the terms “rich” and “poor” relate to wealth, 
not income.  A family can have a low income and 
high wealth, as do many families headed by a retiree. 
Indeed, the second-wealthiest group of families con-
sists of those headed by someone who is 65 or older.4 
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On the other end, a family can have high 
income and little wealth, as do many families 
with a household head who is young and 
highly paid.  
Second, if the shrinking percentage of 
total income of the lowest quintile were 
part of a growing income pie — which the 
Census data confirm it is — low-income 
earners could still be better off than they 
were previously with a slightly larger piece 
of a smaller income pie. 
Third, the data are a series of snapshots 
of people in the various quintiles.  There is 
substantial mobility among quintiles.  This 
means that poor people, even measured by 
income and not wealth, could be better off 
because they moved to a higher quintile.
The Factors Behind  
Income Inequality
Before discussing the increase in income 
inequality, it is important to understand 
some of the major factors behind whatever 
level of income inequality actually exists. 
When noneconomists think about income inequality, 
they tend to picture families in all income quintiles 
looking pretty much alike except for income and 
ethnicity.  They think one or both parents in lower-
quintile families work just as many hours as parents 
in high-income families, if not more.  They assume 
the only difference is that low-income parents work 
for very low wages.  But this picture is false for a 
number of reasons. 
“The number of family members 
working makes a big difference in its 
income level.”
Number of Workers.  High-income households are 
not likely to consist of one person earning a very high 
income (as is often assumed); rather, they are likely 
to have two or more income earners.  Consider the 
income numbers for 2006, reported by the Census 
Bureau [see Figure I]:
l	 A whopping 81.4 percent of families in the 
top quintile have two or more people working, 
and only 2.2 percent have no one working.    
l	 By contrast, only 12.6 percent of families in 
the bottom quintile have two or more people 
working; 39.2 percent have no one working.  
l	 The average number of earners per family for 
the top quintile is 2.16, almost three times the 
0.76 average for the bottom quintile.5  
Amount of Work.  Census data also show a large 
difference in full-time work.  Of the 15.69 million 
families in the bottom quintile, less than one-third 
(5.36 million) have a head of household (the Census 
Bureau now calls them “householders”) working full-
time; in the top quintile, more than three-fourths 









Households with Two or 
More Workers
Households with No 
Workers
Figure I
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 2007 Annual Social 
and Economic Supplement, Current Population 
Survey.
Workers per Household, 2006
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Furthermore, the 12-to-1 ratio of total income 
of the highest-income quintile to the lowest-income 
quintile shrinks considerably when their income per 
week of work is compared.  Commenting on late 1970s 
data, economist Alan Blinder pointed out:  
“[T]he richest [by which Blinder means ‘high-
est-income’] fifth of families supplied over 
30 percent of the total weeks worked in the 
economy…while the poorest [by which Blinder 
means ‘lowest-income’] fifth supplied only 7.5 
percent.  Thus, on a per-week-of-work basis, 
the income ratio of rich and poor was only 
2-to-1.  This certainly does not seem like an 
unreasonable degree of inequality.”6 
Age.  The Census data reveal something else many 
people find surprising:  the correlation between in-
come and age [see Figure II].7  There is a life cycle 
to income. Workers, whether high-school dropouts, 
high-school graduates or college graduates, tend 
to start out at a low income, increase their income 
with experience, and then have lower incomes 
late in their careers or in retirement.
“Workers’ incomes rise with age 
and experience.”
In the lowest quintile, for example, only 33.2 
percent of households are headed by someone in 
the age group from 35 to 54; peak earnings typi-
cally occur within this age range.  In the highest 
quintile, by contrast, 58.5 percent of household 
heads are between the ages of 35 and 54.  As 
would be expected also, the lowest quintile has 
a much larger proportion of elderly household 
heads more than 75 years of age — 11.5 percent 
versus 2.3 percent for the top quintile.  The lowest 
quintile also has more young heads of households 
ages 15 to 24 — 10 percent versus 1.1 percent 
for the top quintile.  
Immigration.  In 1999, 16.8 percent of the 
foreign-born population was poor, versus 11.2 
percent of native-born Americans.8  A higher im-
migration rate increases inequality; however, it can 
do so without making a single person worse off.  This is 
because immigrants, although poor by U.S. standards, 
are likely still better off than they were previously.  In 
addition, adding these immigrants does not directly 
change the economic status of Americans.  The point 
is that increased immigration can make the data on 
inequality look far worse than the reality.
Are the Rich Getting  
Richer while the Poor  
Are Getting Poorer?
If we cannot infer from the data on increasing 
inequality that the rich are getting richer while the 
poor are getting poorer, what is true?
Those who get their information from New York 










Ages 15-24 and 75 
and up
Income Earners by Age, 2006
Figure II
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 2007 Annual Social 
and Economic Supplement, Current Population 
Survey.
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forgiven for concluding that the poor — and everyone 
else below the top 10 percent — are worse off.  But 
Krugman cannot be forgiven because it is not true. 
In a 2004 Nation article, Krugman wrote:
According to estimates by the economists 
Thomas Piketty and Emmanuel Saez — con-
firmed by data from the Congressional Budget 
Office —between 1973 and 2000 the average 
real income of the bottom 90 percent of Ameri-
can taxpayers actually fell by 7 percent.9
But as economist Alan Reynolds has shown, 
Krugman’s statement is wrong for two reasons.10 
First, Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimates 
go back only to 1979.  Second, the CBO data show 
that from 1979 to 2000, average after-tax income in 
each quintile of the household income distribution 
rose. 11  In 2003 dollars, for the lowest quintile it 
rose from $13,500 to $14,600; for the second-low-
est quintile it rose from $27,300 to $30,900; for the 
middle quintile it rose from $38,900 to $44,700; for 
the second-highest quintile it rose from $50,900 to 
$63,300; and for the top quintile it rose from $89,700 
to $151,100.  
“The after-tax income of every in-
come group rose from 1979 to 2000.”
Thus, in order for Krugman’s claim to hold true 
(the CBO reference aside), the average income of 
the bottom 90 percent would have had to have fallen 
drastically between 1973 and 1979 to more than offset 
the later increase.  Reynolds uses U.S. Census data to 
show that no such thing happened.
As for the Piketty-Saez study that Krugman and 
many others have cited, Reynolds points out just 
how implausible their data are as a measure of family 
income.  Piketty and Saez write that in 2000, “the 
median income, as well as the average income for the 
bottom 90 percent of tax units is quite low, around 
$25,000.”12  Note the use of the term “tax units.”  “Tax 
units” are not the same as families.  A single family, 
for example, could have two tax units:  a husband 
and wife filing jointly, and a child filing on his own. 
But that has not stopped Krugman and others from 
writing as if “tax unit” and “family” are synonymous. 
Reynolds points out that if tax units were the same 
as families, highly implausible implications would 
follow.  For instance, given the meaning of the word 
“median,” for Krugman’s claim to be true, 45 percent 
of families (half of 90 percent) would have had to 
make less than $25,000 in 2000.  However: 
l	 U.S. Census data show that the median family 
income for 2000 was $50,732, which means 
that 50 percent of U.S. families made more 
than $50,732.  
l	 If half of all families made more than $50,000, 
and half of the “bottom 90 percent” made less 
than $25,000, the remaining 5 percent of the 
families not accounted for (100 percent minus 
50 percent minus 45 percent) would have had 
incomes above $25,000 but below $50,732.  
It is implausible that the income distribution 
would be so skewed.  The problem is the association 
of "tax unit" with family.
Furthermore, the way Krugman and others have 
relied on the Piketty-Saez data on family welfare is 
completely at odds with their criticism of using tax 
data to estimate income mobility.  In 1992, the U.S. 
Treasury published a study which showed that taxpay-
ers in one income quintile in 1979 were highly likely 
to have moved to another income quintile by 1988. 
In other words, there has been substantial income 
mobility.  But, in 2002, Krugman wrote:
The restriction to individuals who paid taxes 
in all years immediately introduced a strong 
bias toward including only the economically 
successful; only about half of families paid 
income taxes in all ten years.  This bias toward 
the successful was apparent in the fact that 
by the end of the sample period the group 
contained very few poor people and a lot of 
affluent ones: indeed, only 7 percent of the 
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sample were in the bottom quintile by the 
sample's end, while 28 percent were in the 
top quintile.13
This is an important criticism.  But caution ap-
plies to Krugman’s use of data on taxpayers over time. 
Just as one cannot use taxpayer data to infer families’ 
income mobility, one cannot use “tax unit” data to 
estimate how well families in various income classes 
have done.
One other point is important also.  Truth be told, 
we really have no idea what the true income is of the 
highest-income people because so much of it is in 
the form of capital gains.  An increase in the price 
of an asset is income to the owner.  Capital gains are 
reported only when taxpayers sell their assets.  If they 
don’t sell their assets, they could have a huge income 
and we would not know it by looking at published 
government data.  Someone could have a zero reported 
income but a true income of $1 million if his assets 
appreciated by $1 million in a particular year.
Economic Growth.  One factor noted by Reynolds 
that causes increasing inequality is simply economic 
growth.  When the rate of economic growth is high, 
workers see large real increases in income.  But in 
2001, 72.6 percent of the money income received by 
the bottom quintile was in the form of government 
transfer payments, excluding all noncash transfers 
such as Medicaid. 14  In boom times, people in the 
bottom quintile do not get large increases in real 
income because much of their income is transfers 
from government.  The bottom quintile stay in place 
or move up slightly while all other quintiles do better 
due to higher pay and more work.  But this simply 
reflects a booming economy, not that the lowest 
quintile is doing worse. 
Of course, if high economic growth is accompanied 
by inflation, even moderate inflation, many people in 
the bottom quintile could do worse because welfare 
payments are not indexed for inflation but adjusted 
only with a lag.  (This group would not include Social 
Security recipients because their benefits are indexed 
to inflation.)  But it is important to attribute the 
worsening condition to its real cause — inflation 
— not to economic growth, and certainly not to the 
“ill-gotten” gains of those with higher incomes. 
“The top fifth has a lot of income 
from capital gains, while the bottom 
fifth has government transfers.”
Ignoring Consumption.  The issue of inflation brings 
us to another point:  The Consumer Price Index (CPI) 
has exaggerated inflation for at least a few decades. 
Economist Michael Boskin estimates that the CPI 
overstates inflation by 0.8 to 0.9 percentage points 
annually due to three factors:  1) failure to account 
for substitution among goods, 2) failure to account 
for substitution among retail outlets — the so-called 
“Wal-Mart effect,” and 3) failure to account for new 
products.15  This overestimate does not “add up” over 
time — it “compounds up.”  Thus, over 20 years, a 
constant 0.9-percentage-point bias overstates the 
increase in the cost of living by 19.6 percent.  Over 
32 years, it overstates the increase in the cost of living 
by 33.2 percent.  
Moreover, before the Bureau of Labor Statistics 
made adjustments in the late 1990s, the CPI exag-
gerated inflation by more than 0.9 percentage points 
annually.  This means that even when “inflation-ad-
justed” incomes tend to be stagnant, they have actually 
risen.  One way to see this is to look at what people 
have — the kinds of clothing and shoes they have, the 
kinds of appliances they have, the kinds of cars they 
drive, and so forth.  Michael Cox and Richard Alm 
found that on virtually all of these dimensions, the life 
of virtually everyone in the United States improved 
between the early 1970s and the mid-1990s.16    
Potential Pitfalls  
of Redistribution
Interestingly, because of the way incomes are 
often measured, many of the policies that various 
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redistribution advocates propose would, in fact, in-
crease measured inequality.  These policies include:  1) 
increasing marginal tax rates on high incomes and/or 
2) increasing the Earned Income Tax Credit.  
The first policy — increasing marginal tax rates 
— would increase measured inequality as long as the 
supply curve of high income earning labor is even 
slightly upward-sloping.  The reason is that an increase 
in the marginal tax rate would discourage work.  This 
reduction in the supply of labor would drive up the 
before-tax pay of the highest earners.  All other things 
equal, their after-tax pay would decrease and after-
tax inequality would fall — but measured inequality 
would rise.  One can easily imagine advocates of such 
a policy promoting even higher marginal tax rates on 
high earners on the grounds of “we didn’t increase taxes 
enough to have an effect.”  Of course, the ironic result 
would be a further increase in measured inequality. 
The second policy, increasing the Earned Income 
Tax Credit (EITC) by raising the upper end of the 
income range over which people qualify, could have a 
similar effect to increasing marginal tax rates.  Those at 
the new upper end would likely cut their work hours 
— and, therefore, their pay — to get the marginal 
subsidy for not working.  Assuming this effect were 
not enough to cause a noticeable effect on wage rates, 
before-tax incomes of the newly qualifying EITC 
recipients would fall.  Of course, they would be better 
off in income terms, but if the measure of income does 
not include the tax credit, measured inequality would 
increase.  Just as in the case of increases in marginal tax 
rates, one can imagine advocates of an EITC increase 
calling for further increases on the grounds that the 
previous increases were not large enough.
The Effect of Income Mobility
The idea that income inequality measures any-
thing important is undercut to the extent people 
shift frequently from one quintile to another.  And 
in the United States, as in many other relatively free 
countries, income mobility is substantial. 
To repeat:  income mobility is substantial.  Why 
does that need to be emphasized?  Because of a spate 
of articles three years ago in the New York Times and 
the Wall Street Journal that, to careless readers, com-
municated the opposite.17
“Increasing taxes on additional in-
come can raise measured inequality.”
“As Rich-Poor Gap Widens in the U.S., Class 
Mobility Stalls,” read the headline on page one of the 
May 13, 2005, Wall Street Journal.18  Viewing such a 
headline, one would think it means that the income 
mobility of Americans is no longer as great as it was. 
That is what many tend to think upon seeing the verb 
“stalls.”  If it were really true that it had become more 
difficult for Americans to move from one income 
group to another, there would be cause for alarm.  It 
would certainly justify a front-page article in the Wall 
Street Journal.  But it is not true.  Moreover, amaz-
ingly, the Journal’s very own article never claimed that 
income mobility was falling.
Thus, an article with a dramatic headline about 
income mobility having “stalled” doesn’t claim that 
income mobility has in fact fallen.  In the third para-
graph, when the article’s author, David Wessel, finally 
gets to the important facts, he writes:
As the gap between rich and poor has wid-
ened since 1970, the odds that a child born 
in poverty will climb to wealth — or a rich 
child will fall into the middle class — remain 
stuck.  Despite the spread of affirmative action, 
the expansion of community colleges and the 
other social change designed to give people of 
all classes a shot at success, Americans are no 
more or less likely to rise above, or fall below 
their parents’ economic class than they were 
35 years ago.19
In other words, income mobility has not changed 
over the last 35 years.  It turns out that the Journal 
used the word “stall” to mean “remain constant.” 
Just imagine what headlines would look like if the 
newspaper’s editors had the same news sense when 
writing about other things that didn’t happen or that 
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continued on normally.  For example:  “California goes 
another month without earthquake;” “War between 
France and U.K. nowhere on the horizon;” “Women 
continue to get pregnant.” 
In misleading readers about income mobility, 
Wessel was not alone.  Just two days later, the New 
York Times carried an article similar in tone:  “Class in 
America: Shadowy Lines that Still Divide.”  A careful 
reading of the article leads one to the conclusion that, 
if its data are correct, income mobility is unchanged. 
According to the Times, “mobility seems to have 
stagnated.”  Note the use of the word “stagnated.”  It 
means the same thing as “stalled.”  When the article’s 
authors, Janny Scott and David Leonhardt, get to the 
facts, they admit:
Some economists consider the findings of the 
new studies murky; it cannot be definitively 
shown that mobility has fallen during the last 
generation, they say, only that it has not risen.  
The data will probably not be conclusive for 
years.20
Yet throughout their piece, the reporters add lines 
that undercut the message that income mobility is 
unchanged.  They write, for example, “Conservatives 
tend to assert that mobility remains quite high, even 
if it has tailed off a little.”  Yet they cite no evidence 
that mobility has tailed off.  Elsewhere they quote 
Amherst College president Anthony W. Marx as 
saying, “If economic mobility continues to shut down, 
not only will we be losing the talent and leadership we 
need, but we will face a risk of a society of alienation 
and unhappiness.”  
“Many people born in one income 
class move to another.”
But Marx’s statement assumes that economic 
mobility has shut down.  A careful reporter trying to 
give his readers accurate information would not have 
bothered using this statement because it contradicted 
the truth, or would have at least offset it with a quote 
or a comment pointing out the statement’s falsity. 
Scott and Leonhardt did neither.
What is often missing from these arguments is 
that many young people start out in the bottom or 
second-lowest income quintile and move up as they 
acquire skills and are promoted.  Yet even free-market 
economists have ignored this fact.  Commenting on 
the aforementioned 1992 Treasury study, University 
of Chicago economist Kevin M. Murphy stated, “This 
isn’t your classic income mobility.  This is the guy who 
works in the college bookstore and has a real job by 
his early 30’s.”21  But Murphy is wrong.  This is clas-
sic income mobility.  In other words, age is the main 
factor that causes people to move from one income 
category to another.
The Economic Justification  
for Income Inequality
Economists tend to justify substantial inequality 
of earnings on the grounds that it is required to give 
people a strong incentive to be productive.  In the 
extreme case of total equality of earnings, what would 
be anyone’s incentive to become educated, to take a 
job on the Alaska Pipeline, to work overtime, or to 
start a risky business?  The pay incentive would be 
literally zero.  Therefore, substantial pay differentials 
are justified on narrow grounds of efficiency.  As 
economist Finis Welch points out:
Wages play many roles in our economy; along 
with time worked, they determine labor in-
come, but they also signal relative scarcity and 
abundance, and with malleable skills, wages 
provide incentives to render the services that 
are most highly valued.22
That is what economists tend to say when ques-
tioned about the justification for inequality.  But is 
that all?  Is there something major left out?  
The answer is yes.  What is left out is that those 
who have the highest incomes in a free society by and 
large earned them.  Either they earned their income 
as wages and salaries, or as interest, dividends and 
capital gains.  In this sense, inequality is justified.  
Conversely, concern about income inequality 
would be justified if a large part of the income in-
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equality came about due to a lack of freedom — in 
short, in a society of privilege.  The term “privilege” 
is often used today as a synonym for wealth, but the 
19th century British definition of a society of privilege 
is one in which the government grants special status 
to certain groups or people.  For example, slave own-
ers were privileged and slaves were the opposite of 
privileged.  In today’s society, politicians, farmers who 
grow subsidized crops, labor union members, students 
whose college costs are subsidized and beneficiaries of 
government systems of racial quotas are all privileged. 
If income inequalities come about because of privilege, 
those income inequalities are wrong. 
One rough indicator of privilege is the Census 
data on U.S. counties with the highest median house-
hold incomes.  In 2006, five of the top 10 (including 
the top three) were in or around the Washington, 
D.C., metropolitan area.23  One reason for this is 
that government work — working for the govern-
ment or lobbying it — attracts highly skilled people 
who would likely do well elsewhere.  But much also 
has to do with the coercive-transfer state — a large 
government whose major activity is using tax money 
and regulatory power to benefit some at the expense 
of others.  Moreover, these explanations are not nec-
essarily competing; the transfer state attracts smart 
people.  Indeed, this is one of the main arguments 
against the transfer state:  huge amounts of resources 
are wasted on investment in transfers.  
“Inequality due to government-
granted privileges is wrong.”
The income inequalities that result from state 
transfers are derivative wrongs.  They are not the 
fundamental wrong.  The fundamental wrong is the 
government granting of privilege.  If, for example, 
households whose incomes were raised by government 
privilege squandered their wealth so that their only 
source of income were their wages and salaries, and 
not dividends, interest and capital gains, there would 
be less inequality but just as much injustice.
The Philosophical Justification 
for Income Inequality24
Justice and Fairness.  Philosophers have two primary 
ways of judging whether something is fair.  One is the 
end-state view of fairness:  The outcome is fair based 
only on the outcome and not on how it was achieved. 
The other is a process view of fairness:  The outcome’s 
fairness cannot be judged independently of the process 
used to get there.  To contrast the two types of rules, 
consider two people, each with $1 million.  One made 
his by coming up with a new product that he sold to 
customers, and never cheated or lied to any customer 
or employee.  The other designed a clever piece of 
computer software that stole $1 from the bank ac-
counts of each of one million people.  Which of the 
two made his money justly?  Virtually all of us would 
answer that it was the former.  In other words, how the 
person made the money matters a lot.  Yet a straight 
end-state view would say that how the money was 
made doesn’t matter at all.  What this shows is that 
the vast majority holds a process view of justice.  
“Inequality due to income earned 
through work and investment is just.”
Are the Means Important?  Most economists judge 
how just or “equitable” an income distribution is by 
how equal it is; they don’t ask how people obtained 
what they have.  In short, the majority of economists 
have a purely end-state view of justice.  Typical, for 
example, is economist Joseph Stiglitz, former chair-
man of President Clinton’s Council of Economic 
Advisers.  In his textbook, Economics of the Public 
Sector, he writes:
Consider again a simple economy with two 
individuals, Robinson Crusoe and Friday.  
Assume initially that Robinson Crusoe has 
ten oranges, while Friday has only two.  This 
seems inequitable.  Assume, therefore, that we 
play the role of government and attempt to 
transfer four oranges from Robinson Crusoe 
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to Friday, but in the process one orange gets 
lost.  Hence Robinson Crusoe ends up with 
six oranges, and Friday with five.  We have 
eliminated most of the inequity, but in the 
process the total number of oranges available 
has been diminished.  There is a trade-off 
between efficiency — the total number of 
oranges available — and equity.25 
Notice that Stiglitz does not even bother to tell 
the reader how Crusoe and Friday obtained what they 
have.  He doesn’t tell because the process is irrelevant 
to him; all that matters is the end state.  He initially 
hedges by saying it “seems” inequitable rather than 
it is inequitable, but by the end of the paragraph, the 
hedge is gone and Stiglitz comes right out and says 
that inequality is inequitable.  Stiglitz is not alone. 
Many economists move almost seamlessly between 
the words “equity” and “equality” as if they were in-
terchangeable. 
A Possible Dilemma?  The propensity for econo-
mists to use only an end state view of justice brings 
up an interesting dilemma.  While many economists 
write about just distributions of income based solely 
on the degree of inequality, it is unlikely they raise 
their children that way.  They are not indifferent about 
whether their children earned or stole what they have; 
it matters greatly to them how the end state is reached 
because ends in themselves are not enough to justify 
the means.  Thus, on decisions that really matter to 
them — such as child rearing — it is likely that even 
economists turn out to believe in the process view.  The 
problem is not that these economists don’t practice 
what they preach.  What they preach — the end-state 
view of justice — is horrible.  What they practice in 
their child-rearing is quite reasonable.  They should 
preach what they practice.  
The Difficulty of  
Redistribution
Stiglitz reflects another mainstream economic 
viewpoint on income distribution when he writes:
If we don’t like the income distribution gener-
ated by the competitive market, we need not 
abandon the use of the competitive market 
mechanism.  All we need do is redistribute 
the initial wealth, and then leave the rest to 
the competitive market.26
Oh, is that all?  Stiglitz makes redistribution 
sound as easy as changing a graph on a blackboard. 
But, in fact, to “redistribute the initial wealth” in any 
substantial way would probably lead to a bloody civil 
war.  Those whose main wealth is in their house, for 
example, would likely fight to keep their wealth. 
Stiglitz, who is almost certainly a multimillionaire, 
would probably be one of them. 
“Government-enforced equality 
would require constant intervention 
to redistribute income.”
Moreover, once people learn that every time the 
government doesn’t like the income distribution it 
will intervene to change it, they will be less likely to 
do things to earn that wealth.  And you can be sure 
that the government will want to intervene frequently 
because, even if total equality is achieved, the market 
would upset that pattern. A simple example illustrates 
how the market does this.27  In New Jersey, a mother 
gives birth to a large baby who grows up to be bigger 
than all his classmates.  He also is good at basketball 
and hones his skills in high school and college.  When 
the Orlando Magic basketball team hires him, many 
people are willing to pay to see him play.  Therefore, 
teams that would like to sell more tickets are willing 
to pay him to play for them (ask the L.A. Lakers, 
Miami Heat or Phoenix Suns).  Thus does Shaquille 
O’Neal get rich — and contribute to economic in-
equality.  So do many other less visible people who 
have an aptitude for business, or any rare skill that is 
in great demand. 
The free market upsets patterns.  A government de-
voted to enforced equality must intervene again and 
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again to prevent inequality.  Either it must prevent 
wealthy people from spending their money the way 
they want or it must confiscate all income above a 
modest level.  A truly equality-oriented government 
might even try what the regulators tried in the humor-
ous yet haunting short story, “Harrison Bergeron,” by 
Kurt Vonnegut.28  In that story, the government offset 
all inherent advantages of people.  Physically power-
ful men had to wear weights so that they wouldn’t be 
able to perform better than anyone else.  Beautiful 
women had to wear masks to hide their beauty.  Smart 
people had to wear electric headgear that zapped them 
whenever they started to think clearly.  The point is 
that if the government truly dislikes the distribution 
of wealth or income that results from a free market, 
and if it insists on having to “correct” it, we will end 
up with a vicious totalitarian government. 
Conclusion
The entire focus on income inequality is mistaken. 
The vast majority of Americans are prosperous because 
a few million at the top are making a lot of money 
figuring out how to create new products and new ways 
to increase productivity.  Many pundits and analysts sift 
through the data to find inequalities in income, which 
isn’t hard, then try to figure out how to shave some 
off.  They usually suggest new government programs 
or taxes that are destructive of human freedom and 
prosperity.  Instead they should recognize the many 
ways that governments hold people down — in the 
United States and elsewhere — and figure out how 
to end those oppressive measures.  In the long run, 
that will make virtually all of us more prosperous 
and, in the short and long runs, will create a more 
just society.
NOTE: Nothing written here should be construed 
as necessarily reflecting the views of the National 
Center for Policy Analysis or as an attempt to aid 
or hinder the passage of any bill before Congress.
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APPENDIX  TABLE
Share of Aggregate Income Received by Each 
Fifth of Families and Top 5 Percent:  1950 to 2005 
(Families as of March of the following year)
	 Share	of	aggregate	income
	 		 Lowest	 Second	 Third	 Fourth	 Highest	 Top	5
	 Year	 Fifth	 Fifth	 Fifth	 Fifth	 Fifth	 Percent
 2005 4.0 9.6 15.3 22.9 48.1 21.1
 2004 4.0 9.6 15.4 23.0 47.9 20.9
 2003 4.1 9.6 15.5 23.2 47.6 20.5
 2002 4.2 9.7 15.5  23.0  47.6  20.8
 2001 4.2 9.7  15.4 22.9 47.7 21.0
 2000 4.3 9.8 15.4 22.7 47.7 21.1
 1999 4.3 9.9 15.6 23.0 47.2 20.3
 1998 4.2 9.9 15.7 23.0 47.3 20.7
 1997 4.2 9.9 15.7 23.0 47.2 20.7
 1996 4.2 10.0 15.8 23.1 46.8 20.3
 1995 4.4 10.1 15.8 23.2 46.5 20.0
 1994 4.2 10.0 15.7 23.3 46.9 20.1
 1993 4.1 9.9 15.7 23.3 47.0 20.3
 1992 4.3 10.5 16.5 24.0 44.7 17.6
 1991 4.5 10.7 16.6 24.1 44.2 17.1
 1990 4.6 10.8 16.6 23.8 44.3 17.4
 1989 4.6 10.6 16.5 23.7 44.6 17.9
 1988 4.6 10.7 16.7 24.0 44.0 17.2
 1987 4.6 10.7 16.8 24.0 43.8 17.2
 1986 4.7 10.9 16.9 24.1 43.4 16.5
 1985 4.8 11.0 16.9 24.3 43.1 16.1
 1984 4.8 11.1 17.1 24.5 42.5 15.4
 1983 4.9 11.2 17.2 24.5 42.4 15.3
 1982 5.0 11.3 17.2 24.4 42.2 15.3
 1981 5.3 11.4 17.5 24.6 41.2  14.4
 1980 5.3 11.6 17.6 24.4 41.1 14.6
 1979 5.4 11.6 17.5 24.1 41.4 15.3
 1978 5.4 11.7 17.6 24.2 41.1 15.1
 1977 5.5 11.7 17.6 24.3 40.9 14.9
 1976 5.6  11.9 17.7 24.2  40.7 14.9
 1975 5.6 11.9 17.7 24.2 40.7 14.9
 1974 5.7 12.0 17.6 24.1 40.6 14.8
 1973 5.5 11.9 17.5  24.0 41.1 15.5
 1972 5.5  11.9 17.5 23.9 41.4 15.9
 1971  5.5 12.0 17.6 23.8 41.1 15.7
 1970 5.4 12.2  17.6 23.8 40.9 15.6
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 Share	of	aggregate	income
	 		 Lowest	 Second	 Third	 Fourth	 Highest	 Top	5
	 Year	 Fifth	 Fifth	 Fifth	 Fifth	 Fifth	 Percent
 1969 5.6 12.4 17.7 23.7 40.6 15.6
 1968 5.6 12.4 17.7 23.7 40.5 15.6
 1967 5.4 12.2 17.5 23.5 41.4 16.4
 1966 5.6 12.4  17.8 23.8 40.5 15.6
 1965 5.2 12.2 17.8 23.9 40.9  15.5
 1964 5.1 12.0 17.7 24.0 41.2  15.9
 1963 5.0 12.1 17.7 24.0 41.2  15.8
 1962 5.0 12.1 17.6  24.0 41.3  15.7
 1961  4.7 11.9 17.5   23.8 42.2  16.6
 1960 4.8 12.2 17.8  24.0 41.3  15.9
 1959   4.9 12.3  17.9 23.8 41.1 15.9
 1958 5.0 12.5 18.0 23.9 40.6 15.4
 1957 5.1 12.7 18.1 23.8 40.4  15.6
 1956 5.0 12.5 17.9  23.7 41.0 16.1
 1955 4.8 12.3 17.8  23.7 41.3 16.4
 1954  4.5 12.1 17.7  23.9   41.8  16.3
 1953 4.7 12.5 18.0  23.9 40.9 15.7
 1952  4.9 12.3 17.4  23.4  41.9 17.4
 1951 5.0 12.4 17.6  23.4  41.6 16.8
 1950 4.5 12.0 17.4  23.4 42.7 17.3
APPENDIX  TABLE - continued
Share of Aggregate Income Received by Each 
Fifth of Families and Top 5 Percent:  1950 to 2005 
(Families as of March of the following year)
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